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STATEMENT OF THE CASE * 
Statement of the Nature of the Case 
Lloyd Moore as petitioned this Court for the 
review and reversal of a denial of a Motion for review * 
issued by the Industrial Commission of Utah on March 25, * 
1985 denying him a iradical panel hearing on his workmen's 
compensation claim, * 
Disposition of Case in Lower Court $ 
Mr. Moore had requested a medical panel hearing on 
his workmen's compensation claim preceeding a decision on ^ 
his claim. A medical panel hearing was denied and a deci-
sion entered without benefit of having his treating physi-
cian's testimony at a medical panel hearing. Mr. Moore ^ 
filed a motion for review with the Industrial Commission 
requesting a mandatory medical panel hearing. That motion 
was denied on March 25, 1985 and this petition for review i 
follows. #. 
Statement of Facts 
Mr. Moore was first injured in an industrial acci- i 
dent on April 10, 1979 while employed by the American Coal 
Company. The injury was to his right knee. In a decision, * 
issued September 16, 1982 he was found to be 43% impaired i 
and compensated accordingly. (R. 341-346) 
Thereafter, additional surgery was perforemd on Mr. 
Moore's right knee and a claim made for additional benefits. i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(R. 373) A second hearing was held June 28, 1984 following 
surgery of January 29, 1984. At the time of the second 
hearing Mr. Moore was then awaiting more surgery to be per-
formed by Dr. Sherman Coleman at the University of Utah 
School of Medicine who was going to perform total knee 
replacement surgery on Mr. Moore's right knee. That surgery 
took place in September, 1984. Thereafter a second medical 
panel examined Mr. Moore and concluded that the additional 
surgery performed on his right knee in January 1984 and the 
total knee replacement surgery of September 1984 was not 
caused by or related to the industrial injury of April 10, 
1979. (R.398-401) 
A timely objection to the medical panel report was 
filed with the Industrial Commission (R. 404) on February 6, 
1985. The administrative law judge denied the objection and 
declined to schedule a medical panel hearing because no con-
flicting testimony had been profferred with the objections 
to the medical panel report. The administrative law judge 
then entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order (R. 405-407) based solely on the medical panel report 
without permitting Mr. Moore to produce testimony from his 
treating physicians that both the January, 1984 surgery and 
the knee joint replacement surgery of September, 1984 were 
both directly related to his industrial injury of April 10, 
1979. 
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A timely Motion for Review was filed on behalf of 
Mr. Moore (R. 409) and it was denied (R. 414) leading to 
this petition for review. 
Summary of Argument 
A medical panel hearing is mandatory under Section 
35-1-77 Utah Code Annotated when objections are filed to a 
medical panel report. 
ARGUMENT 
Recently this Court decided the case of Johnson v. 
Moore Business Forms, 694 P. 2d 597 (Utah 1984). In the 
Johnson case the Court ruled that the appointment of an 
impartial panel was mandatory under the Utah Occupational 
Disease Disability law Utah Code Ann., 1953, § 35-2-1 to 
-2-65 because the act required that "the Commission shall 
appoint an impartial medical panel. . . .w Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, § 35-2-56(2) (Supp. 1983) (emphasis added.) 
The statute was mandatory in language and the Industrial 
Commission was not free to ignore the clear requirement of 
the statute. The Court also cited Schmidt v. Industrial 
Commission, Utah, 617 P.2d 693 (1980) and Lipman y^ 
Industrial Commission, Utah, 592 P.2d 616 (1969) which 
required the appointment of a medical panel in all workmen's 
compensation cases. Again it was the mandatory language of 
the statute which clearly required the appointment of the 
medical panel. 
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Just as Utah Code Ann., 1953, §35-1-77 requires the 
appointment of a medical panel in mandatory language, it 
also requires in mandatory language the holding of a medical 
panel hearing when objection is made by any party to the 
medical panel report. The law says: 
If objections to such report are filed it 
shall be the duty of the commission to 
set the case for hearing within thirty 
days to determine the facts and issues 
involved. . . . 
It is not within the discretion or power of the Industrial 
Commission to ignore the clear requirement of the statute 
and decline to set a medical panel hearing when an objection 
to the medical panel report is made whether conflicting med-
ical evidence is or is not profferred or for any other 
reason. A hearing must be set and held within thirty days 
of the objection. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Moore is entitled to have the decision of the 
Industrial Commission denying him a medical panel hearing 
reversed and the case remanded to the Industrial Commission 
with instructions that a hearing be set and held in accor-
dance with statutory requirements. 
DATED this ^/^ day of July, 1985. 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
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35-1-77 LABOR—INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
years old, experienced, who was previously 
a mine shift boss and leaser, earning 
higher wages. Brewer v. Industrial Comm., 
89 U. 596, 58 P. 2d 33. 
Findings and conclusions. 
Findings and conclusions as to possible 
future earning capacity under this sec-
tion must be supported by evidence. 
Royal Canning Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 
101 U. 323, 121 P. 2d 406. 
Collateral References. 
Workmen's Compensation^=3835. 
99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 292. 
Anticipation of increase in wages of 
minor as an element in fixing compen-
sation, 21 A. L. R. 1531. 
Right to take rise or fall in wages since 
date of accident into account in fixing 
workmen's compensation, 2 A. L. R. 1642, 
92 A. L. R. 1188. 
35-1-77. Medical panel—Duty of commission to refer case to powers of 
panel—Findings and report—Objections to report—Hearing—Expenses.— 
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or for 
death, arising out of or in the course of employment, and where the em-
ployer or insurance carrier denies liability, the commission shall refer the 
medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the commis-
sion and having the qualifications generally applicable to the medical 
panel set forth in section 35-2-56, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
The medical panel shall make such study, take such X-rays and perform 
such tests, including post-mortem examinations where authorized by the 
commission, as it may determine and thereafter shall make a report in 
writing to the commission in a form prescribed by the commission, and 
shall make such additional findings as the commission may require. The 
commission shall promptly distribute full copies of the report of the panel 
to the claimant, the employer and the insurance carrier by registered mail 
with return receipt requested. Within fifteen days after such report is de-
posited in the United States post office, the claimant, the employer or 
the insurance carrier may file with the commission objections in writing 
thereto. If no objections are so filed within suoh period, the report shall be 
deemed admitted in evidence and the commission may base its finding and 
decision on the report of the panel, but shall not be bound by such report if 
there is other substantial conflicting evidence in the case which supports 
a contrary finding by the commission. If objections to such report are 
filed it shall be the duty of the commission to set the case for hearing with-
in thirty days to determine the facts and issues involved, and at such 
hearing any party so desiring may request the commission to have the 
chairman of the medical panel present at the hearing for examination and 
cross-examination. For good cause shown the commission may order other 
members of the panel with or without the chairman, to be present at the 
hearing for examination and cross-examination. Upon such hearing the 
History: L. 1917, en. 100, §82; C. L. 
1917, §3143; B. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-71. 
Age of employee. 
This section must be read in connec-
tion with 35-1-75 which makes the basis 
of compensation the average weekly wage 
of the employee at the time of injury. 
This section was intended to have a re-
stricted application, and is peculiarly 
adapted to apply in case of minors or 
persons of immature years whose wages 
are usually less than that of adults in like 
employment, but who could be expected 
naturally and normally to reach the wage 
scale of adults with increasing years and 
experience. Where such persons are killed 
or injured in employment, it is only fair 
that they should be placed on a compara-
ble basis with adults, particularly where 
the injury is such as will reach into a 
period beyond maturity. Accordingly, this 
section will not be applied to miner 38 
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 35-1-77. 
written , ,port of the panei may be received as an exhibit but shall not be 
considered as evide? e in the case except in so far as it is sustained by the 
testimony admitted. The expenses of such study and report by the medical 
panel and of th 'T appearance before the commission shall be paid out of 
the fund provided for by section 35-1-68, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended. 
History: L. 195? ch. 52, § 1 ; C. 1943, 
Supp., 42-1-71.10; j . . 1955, ch. 57, § 1 ; 
1969, Cu. 86, § 9. 
Compiler's Not^s. 
The 1955 amendment substituted "in-
jury by accident, or for death, arising out 
of or in the course of employment" for 
"disability as in this title defir^d, or for 
death, resulting from an occupational 
disease" near the beginning of the first 
sentence; substituted a reference to the 
Utah Code for a reference to Laws 1949 
in the first sentence; substituted "pre-
scribed by the commission" for "following 
generally that prescribed in chapter 51, 
Laws of Utah 1949, and relating to par-
tial permanent disability cases" in the 
second sentence; and made a minor change 
in phraseology. 
The 1969 amendment substituted "chair-
man of the medical panel" for "medical 
panel or any of its members" in the sixth 
sentence; and inserted the seventh sen-
tence. 
Title of Act. 
An act providing for the appointment 
of a medical panel with reference to total 
permanent disability and death cases aris-
ing from occupational disease.—L. 1951, 
ch. 52. 
Duty of commission on remand of case. 
Where an order o' the commission was 
vacated and the <; :se remanded because 
of a deficiency in ae evide_^e to support 
the report of a meoical panel appointed by 
the commission, the commission was not 
required to make an award based solely on 
the plaintiff's evidence; but it was the re-
sponsibility of the commission to make 
some disposition of plaintiff's application 
for an award and it was the prerogative 
of the commission to make a determina-
tion upon the evidence in the light of the 
decision of the Supreme Court or to order 
and hold z> supplemental heading to allow 
the parties to present additiona1 evidence. 
Hackford v. Industrial Comm., 12 TJ. (2d) 
250, 364 R 2d 1091. 
Objections to report. 
Where plaintiff filed written objections 
to the report of a medical panel which had 
been appointed by the commission and ob-
jected to the report at the hearings, the 
burden was on the commission or the 
employer to sustain the report by oral 
testimony and, where this was not done, 
the report could not be considered as evi-
dence. Hackford v. Industrial Comm., 11 
TJ. (2d) 312, 358 P. 2d 899. 
Where industrial commission had grant-
ed medical expenses from time of claim-
ant's injury to June 13, 1962, and work-
men's compensation to and including 
February 12, 1962, it did not act arbitrar-
ily in denying payments for any later 
periods, the evidence at the hearing on 
objections to report of medical panel 
showing that hospitalization on January 
18, 1962, was made necessary by accident 
in course of claimant's employment caus-
ing temporary loss of control of claimant's 
diabetes; total temporary disability ceased 
on claimant's return to work initially fol-
lowing accident; there was no permanent 
disability; and further medical treatment 
was not needed as the result of the acci-
dent. Sanderson v. Industrial Comm., 16 
TJ. (2d) 348, 400 P. 2d 756. 
Panel report as evidence. 
In denying workmen's compensation 
benefits to claimant, industrial commis-
sion did not err in considering report of 
medical panel appointed by commission 
along with other evidence; medical panel 
and report did not encroach upon author-
ity vested in commission to make findings 
of fact and conclusions. Jensen v. United 
States Fuel Co., 18 U. (2d) 414, 424 P. 
2d 440, distinguished in 25 TJ. (2d) 58^ 
475 P. 2d 835. 
In determining that order of commis-
sion denying award was supported by suffi-
cient evidence, question whether panel re-
port submitted to commission should be 
considered as evidence was of no impor-
tance where one of panel members ap-
peared and testified before commission, and 
that testimony alone was sufficient to sus-
tain order of commission. McWilliams v. 
Industrial Comm., 21 TJ. (2d) 266, 444 P. 
2d 513. 
Although great respect must be paid to 
panel of medical experts appointed pur-
suant to this section, they are not ulti-
mate finders of fact but rather reporters 
of medical aspects of given case in aid 
of industrial commission's appraisal and 
weighing of all facts; therefore, where 
commission adopted panel's conclusion 
which was unsupported by any credible 
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JAMES R. HASENYAGER 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
Attorneys for Claimant 
2661 Washington Blvd., Suite 2^ 2 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-3662 
Utah State Bar No. 1404 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
STATE OF UTAH 
LLOYD MOORE, : 
Claimant, : OBJECTION TO MEDICAL PANEL 
REPORT 
vs. : 
AMERICAN COAL CO., : 
Employer, : 
Claimant objects to the medical panel report for 
the reason that the conclusion of the panel that the total 
knee replacement operation was unrelated to his April, 1979 
industrial injury is, in the opinion of his treating physi-
cians, clearly incorrect. 
DATED this & day of February, 1985. 
MARQUARDT, HASENAYGER & CUSTEN 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 81000833 
LLOYD MOORE, * 
Applicant, * FINDINGS OF FACT 
vs. * CONCLU-^ONS OF LAW, 
AMERICAN COAL COMPANY and/or STATE * ANJ ORDER
 % 
INSURANCE FUND and SECOND INJURY FUND, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 East 
Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah, on June 28, 1984, at 10:00 
o'clock a.m.; same being pursuant to Order and Notice of the 
Commission. 
BEFORE: Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The Applicant was present and represented by James R. 
Hasenyager, Attorney at Law. 
The Defendants American Coal Company and/or State Insurance Fund 
were represented by Dennis V. Lloyd, Attorney at Law. 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, th<* medical issues and 
questions were submitted to a Medical Panel appointed I the Administrative 
Law Judge. The Medical Panel Report was received, and copies were distributed 
to the parties. Applicant, by and through counsel, filei an objection to the 
Medical Panel Report on February 8, 1985, indicating that the Applicant's 
treating physicians disagreed with the same. There being no proffer of 
conflicting medical testimony, the Administrative Law Judge has reviewed the 
file and the Medical Panel Report, and finds that the objections to the 
Medical Panel Report should be denied, and the Medical Panel Report is 
admitted into evidence. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
This case concerns whether or not the industrial injury of April 10, 
1979, resulted in the need for surgery and temporary total disability after 
November 5, 1983. 
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LLOYD MOORE 
ORDER 
PAGE TWO 
This case was previously heard and was the subject of Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order and three Amended Orders. As a result 
thereof, the Applicant was given an award of 35% of the whole man due to 
pre-existing conditions, and 8% of the whole man due to the industrial injury 
of April 10, 1979. The present Application concerned the denial by the State 
Insurance' Fund of liability for a surgery of November 5, 1983, to the 
Applicant*** right knee, and an additional surgery to the right knee of January 
30, 1984, and a proposed right knee replacement. In addition, the Applicant 
was cla;micig additional temporary total disability since November 5, 1983, as 
a result of the industrial injury of April 10. 17979. With the file in this 
posture, the case was referred to the Medical Panel for its evaluation. 
The Medical Panel found that the Applicant had not been temporarily 
totally disabled since November 5, 1983, as a result of the industrial injury 
of April 10, 1979. The Panel further found that the Applicant's present 
problems in his right knee are due to the injury he sustained in the military 
service, and that there was no contribution to his present problems by the 
industrial injury of April 10, 1979. Accordingly, the surgery of November 5, 
1983, the surgery of January 30. 1984, and the total knee replacement surgery, 
were found not to be a result of the industrial injury of April 10, 1979. 
Finally, there has been no increase in impairment due to the industrial injury 
of April 10, 1979. The Administrative Law Judge adopts the findings of the 
Medical Panel as his own. 
Pursuant to the findings of the Medical Panel, there is no causal 
connection between the Applicant's present right knee complaints and the 
industrial injury of April 10; 1979. Accordingly, the Applicant has not met 
his burden of showing a substantial change of condition so as to warrant the 
re-opening of his claim. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The Applicant has not met his burden of showing a substantial change 
in condition. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of Lloyd Moore for additional 
surgery and benefits as a result of the industrial injury of April 10, 1979, 
should be, and the same is hereby dismissed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date 
hereof speci- fying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless 
so filed this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
LLOYD MOORE 
ORDER 
PAGE THREE 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
ltMi. day of March, 1985. 
ATTEST: 
Lui„ Linda J. Strasburg 
Linda J, Strasburg 
Commission Secretary 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the *}.th. day of March, 1985, a copy of the 
attached Order was mailed to each of the following persons at the following 
addresses, postage paid: 
American Coal Company 
Emery Mining Corporation 
P.O. Box 310 
Huntington, UT 84528 
"james R. Hasenyager, Attorney at Law 
2661 Washington Boulevard, Suite 202 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Dennis V. Lloyd, Attorney at Law 
^Utah State Insurance Fund 
P.O. Box 45420 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-1420 
t Gilbert A. Martinez, Administrator 
Second Injury Fund 
Lloyd Moore 
389 North 100 West 
Moroni, UT 84646 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By DeAnn 
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JAMES R. HASENYAGER 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2661 Washington Blvd., Suite 202 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-3662 
Utah Bar License No. 1404 
I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 81000833 
LLOYD MOORE, : 
Applicant, : MOTION FOR REVIEW 
vs.s v : 
< 
AMERICAN COAL COMPANY and/or : 
STATE INSURANCE FUND and 
SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendants. : 
Claimant Lloyd Moore, by and through his attorney 
James R. Hasenyager hereby moves the Industrial Commission 
to review the findings of fact, conclusions of law and order < 
entered in claimants case by Timothy C. Allen, Administrative 
Law Judge for the reason that the order was entered despite 
the claimant having filed an objection to findings of the \ 
medical panel and requesting that a medical panel hearing be 
scheduled. Judge Allen stated that no contrary medical 
testimony had been profferred. That ruling is contrary to 
the clear language of Section 35-1-77 Utah Code Annotated 
which requires the appointment of a medical panel in every 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Moore v. American Coal 
Page 2 
case and requires the commission set a medical panel hearing 
when requested by a party who objects to the findings of the 
medical panel. 
The case of Johnson v. Moore Business Forms, 
INA/Aetna and the Industrial Commission filed by our Supreme 
Court on December 3, 1984 a copy of which is attached is 
dispositive. 
s? 
DATED this __/_ day of March, 1985. 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
/ / / ' . 
.^James R* Hasenyager 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this <&/( day of March, 1985, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion for 
Review, postage prepaid, to: 
Dennis V. Lloyd, Utah State Insurance Fund 
P.O. Box 45420, Salt Lake City, UT 84145-1420 
Gilbert A. Martinez, Administrator 
Second Injury Fund 
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ARCHIVES i 
IN THK SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * J > 
rooOooo 
Linda R. Johnson, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Moore Business Foruis , IN£ 'Aetna 
and the Industrial Commi ; ;ion of Utah 
Defendants and Respondents. 
*' t 
Arthur F. Sandack 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
Gilbert Martinez 
Shaun Howell 
Robert Shaughnessy 
Frank Nelson 
M u o inaA Defendants December 3, 1984
 d 
Respondents• 
No. 19630 
F I L E D 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
The issue in this review from the Industrial Commission 
is whether an administrative law jud^e can dispose of a claim 
of permanent partial disability under the Utah Occupational 
Disease Disability Law without calling a medical panel. 
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Despite the clear requirement of the statute that 
upon the mere filing of such a claim a medical panel "shall" 
be convened, the administrative law judge took it upon him-
self to hold a hearing, consider the evidence, including the 
supportive medical opinion of Mrs. Johnson's doctor, and make 
findings of fact and conclusions of law that Mrs*. Johnson's 
tenosynovitis did not result from any of the causes enumerated 
in suction 35-2-27(25), including "friction" :r "repeated 
trauma." He then dismissed her claim. 
The administrative law judge seemed to be operating 
under the unspoken premise that not every claim filed that 
alleges the statutory elements requires convening a medical 
panel; only those cases that pass some threshold test of 
meri toriousness established by the administrative Jaw judge 
may go forward. That interpretation of the statute is contrary 
to the plain language of section 35-2-56(2) and, furthermore, 
is flatly contrary to this Court's holdings in Schmidt v. 
Industrial Commission, Utah, 617 P.2d 693, 695-96 (1980), and 
Lipman v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 592 P.2d 616, 618 (1979). 
In those cases, we ruled that similar language in the Workers' 
Compensation Act required the convening of a medical panel 
in all cases. Utah Code Ann., 1953, § 35-1-77 (1974 ed.). 
The instant case presents an even- more compelling 
reason than existed in Schmidt for applying the statute lit-
erally. Section 35-2-56(2) of the Utah Occupational Disease* 
Disability Law includes language describing the legislature's 
purpose in requiring that all questions of causation and dis-
ability raised by a claim be referred to a medical panel, 
language that was absent from the parallel section of the 
Workers' Compensation Act construed in Schmidt. In section 
35-2-56(2) the legislature specifically found that these ques-
tions present "highly technical" issues and that the "difficult 
task" of dealing with these issues "should be placed in the 
hands of physicians specially trained for the care and treat-
ment of the occupational disease involved." Given this legis-
lative finding, we are not free to depart from the nterp~e-
tation placed upon the similar language in Schmidt, despite 
the fact that the legislature later amended the Workers' 
Compensation Act to delete the requirement that a medical 
panel be convened in every case. 
In the present case, Mrs. Johnsonfs claim met the 
required statutory minimum to trigger the convening of a medical 
T^ In 1982, the legislature amended section 35-1-77 to make 
convening of a medical panel discretionary under the Workers' 
Compensation Act. 1982 Utah Laws ch. 41 § 1. This amend-
ment effectively reversed Schmidt on this issue. However, 
it is worth noting that no such change was made in the similar 
language used in section 35-2-52(2) of the Utah Occupational 
Disease Disability Law, perhaps because the legislature thought 
the latter act required more sophisticated determinations, 
best made only with expert assistance. 
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panel. Section 35-2-27(25) of the Act requires that to be 
compensable tenosynovitis of the wrist must be caused, inter 
alia, by job-related continual "friction" or "repeated trauma." 
Mrs. Johnson claimed that job-related repeated trauma :aused 
tenosynovitis of her wrist. She testified about the repetitive 
twisting wrist movements required by her job and produced a 
letter from her doctor, Dr. Hyde, opining that tne roquirem nts 
of her job played a causative role in her wrist problems. 
Once she made this showing, a medical panel had to be bailee 
to report on whether the continual twisting motions required 
by Mrs. Johnson's job constituted "friction" or "repeated 
trauma" and whether this trauma eventually resulted in her 
tenosynovitis. 
The administrative law judge invaded the province 
of the medical panel when, without input from a panel, he 
found that Mrs. Johnson's job did not involve the statutorily 
required pressure, friction, trauma, or vibration. 
We reverse the administrative law judge's holding 
and remand for further proceedings before a properly called 
medical panel. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice I. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Justice Christine M. Durham, Justice 
H In his findings, the administrative law judge also 
tressed the fact that nothing unusual or accidental in nature 
ad occurred on the day Mrs. Johnson first reported pain, 
hat fact is irrelevant. It is only when the injury complained 
f does not fit under the Utah Occupational Disease Disability 
aw and is dealt with under the Workers' Compensation Act 
hat the claimant must show an identifiable accident as a 
rerequisite to recovery. See Pintar v. Industrial Commission, 
1 Utah 2d 276, 277, 382 P.2d 414 (1963). 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 81000833 
LLOYD MOORE, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
AMERICAN COAL COMPANY and/or 
STATE INSURANCE FUND and 
SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * * 
DENIAL OF 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
On or about March A, 1985, an Order was entered by an Administrative 
Law Judge of the Commission wherein benefits were denied in the above entitled 
case. 
On or about March 8, 1985, the Commission 
Review from the Applicant by and through his attorney. 
received a Motion for 
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire Commission for 
review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated. The Commission 
has reviewed the file in the above entitled case and we are of the opinion 
that the Motion for Review should be denied and the Order of the Administra-
tive Law Judge affirmed. In affirming, the Commission adopts the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Administrative Law Judge. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the Administrative Law 
Judge dated March 4, 1985, shal*1 be, ani the same is hereby, affirmed and the 
Motion for Review shall be, and the same is hereby, denied. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
JZ5* jiay of March, 1985. 
s^ Miwu 
Stephen M. Hadley 
f 
Chairman 
^t i i 
Commission 
sburg 
ecretary 
& . 
V 
.4&<* ^ ^<^U^ *t*-J? 
Walter T. Axelgard 
Commissioner 
J' 
s*j*fit+c~f -
Lenlxe L. Nielsen 
Commissioner 
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I certify that on March ~< / 1985, a copy of the attached 
Denial of Motion for Review was mailed to the following persons at the 
following addresses, postage paid: 
Lloyd Moore, 389 North 100 West, Moroni, UT 84646 
/James R. Hasenyager, Atty., 2661 Washington Blvd., Suite 202, 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Dennis V* Lloyd, Atty., State Insurance Fund, 560 South 300 
East, SLC, UT 84111 
Gilbert A. Martinez, Administrator, Second Injury Fund 
American Coal Company, Emery Mining Corporation, P. 0. Box 310, 
Huntington, UT 84528 
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